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ABSTRACT. In the first study of opinions handed down in education adequacy litigation 
between January 2005 and January 2008, this paper shows a marked shift away from 
outcomes favorable to adequacy plaintiffs.  Following two decades in which courts 
spurred significant reforms in our nation’s neediest schools by interpreting the education 
clauses of their state constitutions to guarantee an “adequate” education for all students, 
the years 2005 to 2008 have seen a dramatic change in the judicial response to adequacy 
litigation.  Through an analysis of the latest body of cases, this paper shows that 
separation of powers concerns have begun to drive state courts out of this important 
avenue of education reform.  These separation of powers concerns have become more 
salient as litigators pressure courts to mandate concrete remedies that would trump 
legislative discretion.  The most problematic such remedy is one that would require 
courts to order the legislature to make specific budgetary allocations.  This trend spans  
courts seeing adequacy claims for the first time and those presiding over a second round 
of adequacy litigation.  This paper argues that despite this shift recent courts have not 
wholly disavowed their role in substantiating the state constitutional right to education.  
Courts remain willing to act as a constitutional check on the legislature’s actions within 
the field of education if only plaintiffs can find a way to respond to concerns over 
remedies.  This paper examines the nature of and reasons for courts’ increasing 
separation of powers concerns and then briefly explores what lessons adequacy plaintiffs 
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 Over the last two decades, state courts have spurred significant reforms in our 
nation’s neediest schools.  Interpreting the right to education enshrined in every state 
constitution, state courts have demanded that their executive and legislative branches take 
action to guarantee an “adequate” education for all of their state’s students, not just those 
lucky enough to live in a well-funded school district.  By applying pressure for legislative 
and court-ordered improvements, “education adequacy” litigation has achieved huge 
reforms in education funding across the country. 
During the past three years, however, state courts have delivered a string of 
disappointing decisions to adequacy plaintiffs. While those courts have articulated a 
variety of  state-specific rationales for rejecting adequacy claims, their opinions reveal a 
common concern with the boundaries between their judicial role and the prerogatives of 
the legislature.    
Education adequacy suits have challenged courts to enforce not only suitable 
education standards in their states, but, more generally, to find a suitable role for 
themselves in education reform.1  The prospect of interfering in an area – such as 
education policy – that is traditionally seen as a legislative prerogative makes judges 
especially uneasy.   At the same time, state judiciaries are reluctant to abandon this 
affirmative constitutional right completely to a political process prone to fail the children 
                                                 
1See e.g., Michael A. Rebell, Symposium: High-Poverty Schooling in America: Lessons in Second-Class Citizenship: What are 
the Limits and Possibilities of Legal Remedies?: Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the 
Courts, 85 N.C.L. Rev. 1467, 1538 (2007). 
4 
most in need.2  Between 1989 and 2005, the tension between these dueling concerns was 
generally resolved in favor of adequacy plaintiffs– who won more than 75% of the cases.3   
  As the adequacy movement matures, however, the balance between deference and 
action by courts in adequacy suits has begun to tip towards deference and away from 
judicial intervention.  In fact, since 2005, courts’ unease with adjudicating these cases has 
proven difficult to surmount.   Plaintiffs’ adequacy claims were dismissed before ever 
reaching trial in nine of the nineteen decisions handed down over the past three years.4  
The Supreme Courts of Texas and Massachusetts both reversed lower-court rulings in 
favor of adequacy plaintiffs,  finding instead that current school systems met 
constitutional standards despite obvious continued disparities and failures.5  Similarly, in 
South Carolina and Alaska, trial courts rejected claims that the school systems in their 
states suffered from inadequate funding.6  And, despite prior findings that the constitution 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Ian Millheiser What Happens to a Dream Deferred?: Cleansing the Taint of San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez  55 DUKE L.J. 405 (2005) (Arguing that because political branches are structurally ill-suited 
to protect the affirmative right to an adequate education, “judicial restraint’ leaves undereducated Americans 
without recourse to any branch of government.”); Larry J. Obhof Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State 
School Finance Litigation 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569 (2004) (Discussing structural disincentives for the 
political branches to adequately fund schools or reform the school finance system absent external pressure). 
3 Between 1989 and 2005, plaintiffs prevailed in twenty of twenty-five final decisions of the highest state courts 
or unappealed trial court decisions. See National Access Network, School Funding "Adequacy" Decisions Since 1989 
(Oct. 2006), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/adequacydecisions.pdf. 
4 See Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State of Arizona No. 04-0076 (Ariz. App. Nov. 22, 2006); Labato v. State 
of Colorado Case Number: 05 CV 4794 (Co. Dist. Ct. 2006); Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education 
Funding et. al. v. Rell No. X 09 CV 05 4019406 (CT Sup. Ct. 2007); Bonner v. Daniels Cause No. 
49D01604PL016414  (Indiana Sup. Ct. 2007); Young v. Williams No. 03-00055/01152 (Cir. Ct., Div. II., Feb. 
13, 2007), Pendleton School District 16R et al. v. State of Oregon et al. [No written opinion] (2007); 
Committee for Educational Equality (CEE) v. State of Missouri Case No. 04CV323022 (Cir. Ct., Div. II, 2007); 
Neb Coalition for Ed Equity & Adequacy v. Heinman 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007); Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. State 
ex rel. Oklahoma Legislature 158 P.3d 1058 (2007). 
5Hancock v. Driscoll,  443 Mass. 428 (2005); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Independent School Dist., 
176 S.W.3d 746 (2005). 
6 See Moore v. State of Alaska, No. 3AN-04-9756 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 2007); Abbeville County School District  v. 
State, No. 93-CP-31-0169 (South Carolina Court of Common Pleas 2007).  
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demanded increased school funding, the highest courts in New York and Kansas largely 
left their legislatures to judge for themselves how much funding is enough.7 
This backwards trend in adequacy suits comes in the face of developments that 
would seem to bode well for the movement.  Despite ever-more mobilized opposition,8 
adequacy plaintiffs could reasonably expect to be more successful as adequacy litigation 
strategies are perfected and they are able to build on prior precedent establishing both the 
justiciability of these cases and the substance of state constitutional rights to education.  
In addition, the rise of the “New Accountability” movement – as demonstrated by the 
passage of the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 and the No Child Left Behind 
Act in 20029 - introduced education standards that were expected to encourage judicial 
supervision of education reform by giving substance to the constitutional right and 
shielding courts from attacks of judicial caprice.10 
Having acknowledged the critical role the judiciary must play to protect every 
child’s right to education, and in the face of new standards that help substantiate the 
adequacy of an education, why are courts now – at all stages of adequacy litigation – 
bowing out of education reform?  Given the overwhelming shift in courts’ responses to 
their lawsuits, this is a question all current adequacy plaintiffs must confront. 
The answer, as it turns out, is both straightforward and deeply troubling from the 
perspective of future litigants.  A close reading of the most recent adequacy decisions 
finds judges expressing a surprisingly unified concern: state courts across the country are 
                                                 
7 See Montoy v. State of Kansas, 282 Kan. 9, 138 P.3d 755 (2006); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State 861 
N.E.2d 50 (2006). 
8 In response to the initial string of adequacy victories, states began to seek external expertise and share 
best practices for how to mount an effective defense to this novel claim.   
9 See e.g. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 937-39 
(2004). 
10 See e.g. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil 
Rights Agenda, 81 N.C.L. REV. 1703, 1718-20 (2002-2003). 
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ill at ease with the role they have been cast in modern adequacy litigation – a role they 
increasingly fear may run afoul of traditional separation of powers precepts.   
By 2005, many state courts had already ruled in favor of judicial review in 
education cases and recent events have seen no dramatic facial reversals of this 
precedent.  Superficially, only four recent courts explicitly dismissed adequacy claims as 
non-justiciable.  Yet, even the claims disposed of on other grounds were victims of the 
same overarching justiciability concerns: judges refused to grant plaintiffs relief for fear 
that adequacy suits have forced courts over the boundary separating the judiciary from 
other branches of government.   In fact, a close reading of the recent case law makes clear 
that core justiciability concerns are not only pervasive, but often decisive.  For example, 
the Supreme Court of Texas vigorously defended the court’s duty to determine the 
constitutionality of the public school system at the same time that it essentially cited 
separation of powers concerns in upholding the state’s school finance system.11  In the 
same vein, a Connecticut trial court paid lip service to that state’s binding precedent that 
the courts must enforce and thereby delineate the state constitution’s education guarantee, 
but imported a classic justiciability analysis under another name in order to dismiss the 
adequacy portion of a recent suit.12  And finally, even as the Chief Justice of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court used neither the words “separation of powers” nor 
“justiciability” in writing for the plurality dismissing an adequacy suit, the logic of her 
argument was driven by a keen sense of the judiciary’s limited role in matters such as 
education that involve the state budget and other primarily legislative concerns.13   
                                                 
11 See infra Section II.C.  
12 Id. 
13 See infra Section II.A. 
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Education advocates must confront the reality of this shifting pendulum in 
adequacy suits. The constitutional right to education is a powerful tool. It has done much 
to improve education in schools across the country.  It has been a critical means for 
advocates to ensure educational opportunities to those who would be otherwise left 
behind by the political process.  Yet the state constitutional right to education is in danger 
of being rendered meaningless, even as recent decisions leave it superficially intact.  The 
modern education adequacy litigation formula, particularly to the extent that it portrays 
adequacy as a pot of money, threatens to foreclose future causes of action under state 
education clauses as courts set broad and unfavorable precedent.14     
This result is not inevitable. While expressing discomfort with the demands of 
recent litigation, courts have not wholly disavowed their role in substantiating the state 
constitutional right to education.  Thus, there is reason to believe that courts remain 
willing to act as a constitutional check on the legislature’s actions within the field of 
education, if only plaintiffs can find a way to respond to their concerns.  In order to 
initiate that vital conversation, this article examines the adequacy decisions delivered 
between January 2005 and January 2008 to better understand the nature of and reason for 
the increased separation of powers concerns expressed therein. It then briefly explores 
what lessons adequacy plaintiffs might take away for use in future litigation. 
                                                 
14 Strong nonjusticiability precedent may foreclose not only alternative forms of adequacy claims under the 
state education clause, but also equity claims.  Further, even if courts carefully preserved judicial review of 
the school system under the state equal protection clause, there is no consensus that equal protection claims 
alone can achieve the necessary reform.  This is why advocates turned to adequacy initially.  First, equity 
simply may not be enough: it costs more money to educate students with greater needs, such as bi-lingual 
or at-risk students.  It has yet to be seen whether courts will go beyond horizontal equity to embrace a 
theory of “vertical equity.”  Second, education advocates turned their energy toward adequacy suits in part 
because equity suits received a lukewarm welcome in state courts. See Ryan supra note 16.  Finally, from a 
practical perspective, equity suits may be less conducive to sparking reform by the political branches. 
Whereas adequacy suits are seen as a fight for better schools for all children, equity suits tend to pit the 
poor against the wealthy thereby impeding political progress.  To the extent that adequacy campaigns are 
truly won in the court of public opinion this is an important consideration. 
8 
Part I provides a short overview of the origins and evolution of education 
adequacy litigation.  Its focus is on those aspects of the historical context that help 
illuminate the challenges faced by modern adequacy litigants. 
Part II turns to the adequacy decisions delivered between January 2005 and 
January 2008.  It argues that over the past three years, increasing separation of powers 
concerns have begun to drive state courts out of an important avenue of education reform.  
These separation of powers concerns have become more salient as courts are increasingly 
pushed – by maturing cases and litigation strategies – toward mandating concrete 
remedies at the expense of the Legislature’s discretion. The most alarming such remedy 
for courts is the sense that adequacy suits will require them to order the legislature to 
make specific budgetary allocations.   Judges’ natural distaste for budgetary intervention 
is aggravated by newly converging factors such as increasingly proactive legislative 
involvement in the area of school funding, evidence of improving schools, and growing 
doubts that money alone can transform those schools that continue to struggle.  Further, 
courts are functioning against a new backdrop: the aftermath of judicial intervention in 
other jurisdictions. Although adequacy suits have done much to increase funding, 
improve schools, and draw attention to the children left behind by the political process,15 
courts looking to other states also see interminable litigation, ever-growing demands from 
plaintiffs, and tension-fraught showdowns between the judiciary and legislatures.  
Part II groups recent courts’ predominant concerns in recent adequacy opinions 
into three categories.  First, the maturation of the adequacy movement poses new 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 1 at 1527-28 (citing instances in which courts’ interventions have resulted in 
significant reductions in spending disparities between rich and poor school districts, increased achievement, 
and improved facilities and noting significant reforms driven by adequacy cases even where plaintiffs have not 
prevailed). 
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remedial challenges.  During the initial waves of adequacy litigation, courts could be 
responsive to plaintiffs merely by adopting a traditional judicial role: they could declare 
the constitutional right and leave the legislature to design a remedy.  Recent evidence 
suggests that second generation cases - in which plaintiffs press the legislature for further 
reform - may force courts to make a difficult choice between aggressive judicial 
intervention and total abdication of the issue to the legislature. Further, the very success 
of early education suits and the reforms they engendered may be a barrier to continued 
success. Whereas courts confidently intervened in the face of legislatures that had clearly 
abdicated their constitutional duties to provide a rational system of education to state 
school children, they are less willing to order remedial action that would interfere with 
legislative appropriations when the plight of school children in their state is no longer as 
dire.  
Second, separation of powers concerns have been exacerbated by litigation 
strategies increasingly focused on appropriations as the benchmark and remedy for an 
inadequate education.  Adequacy suits have always fought for more resources. But this 
fight has recently begun to center on specific funding levels rather than more systemic 
reforms.  This shift in emphasis implies to courts that any outcome favoring plaintiffs 
must entail explicitly ordering the legislature to spend more money, something every 
court is hesitant to do. When faced with an either or proposition, courts have chosen to 
find for defendants rather than grant a funding-centered remedy.  Moreover, courts are 
even less likely to intrude into the legislature’s budget allocations if – as is increasingly 
the case - they doubt more money alone can solve the problem. 
10 
And finally, these separation of powers concerns are contagious. Many recent 
opinions echo the justiciability arguments of sister states.  As courts weigh the benefits of 
engaging their coercive power against the risk of diluting their own legitimacy or 
encroaching on another branch’s prerogatives, recent experiences in other states are a 
primary source of guidance.  With more precedent to look to, courts have seemed to find 
much to dissuade them from substantively entering the fray.   Thus, both recent out-of-
state opinions and the aftermath of prior adequacy decisions have shaped the latest 
adequacy outcomes.   
I. ADEQUACY LITIGATION’S ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO 
MODERN CHALLENGES 
Though this article focuses primarily on the latest education adequacy litigation, 
we begin with a brief overview of education litigation in the United States. This cursory 
review is meant only to flag those aspects of the historical context that shed light on the 
challenges faced by modern adequacy litigation.  The origins and evolution of adequacy 
litigation are treated in greater detail elsewhere.16  
 
A. The First Wave: The U.S. Constitution and Equal Protection 
Scholars typically describe the history of education litigation in three waves. In 
the First Wave of education litigation, plaintiffs sought justice in federal courts under the 
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.  The seminal case during this 
genesis period was San Antonio v. Rodriguez.17  While the public education received by 
Demetrio Rodriguez in the Edgewood Independent School District in 1968 was inferior 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., James Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249 (1999); Michael Rebell, Education Adequacy, 
Democracy and the Courts, 38-60 (Paper prepared for the National Academy of Sciences and the National 
Research Council, 2001). 
17 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973). 
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to the education available in wealthier Texas districts by almost any measure,18 the 
plaintiffs’ litigation strategy focused specifically on the inequity of the school finance 
system.  Due to its heavy reliance on local property taxes, the school finance system 
generated gross disparities in funding between poor and rich school districts. In contrast 
to disparities in educational opportunity or academic achievement, disparities in per pupil 
funding were the most direct, unmitigated evidence of state abdication of the 
responsibility to educate all children, offering plaintiffs what seemed to be the strongest 
case that Rodriguez had been denied equal protection under the laws. 
 While a federal district court found for the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, a divided 
Supreme Court reversed. Notwithstanding the dissent’s accusation that they were leaving 
“appellees to the vagaries of [a] political process which …has proved singularly unsuited 
to the task of providing a remedy,” the Supreme Court held that, because education is not 
a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution, the Texas school financing plan 
would only be subject to rational basis review.  Under that lenient standard, the Court 
found the dramatic disparities created by the Texas funding scheme to be rationally 
related to the legitimate state interests in “assuring basic education” while permitting and 
encouraging local control of schools.19  Thus, Demetrio Rodriguez must seek justice 
elsewhere. 
 
B. The Second Wave: State Courts and Equal Protection 
In the so-called second wave of education litigation, plaintiffs across the country 
turned to the state courts for relief.  Advocates hoped that state courts – bolstered by 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. 
& POL'Y REV. 607 (1999).  
19 Rodriguez, at 49. 
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explicit education clauses in their state constitutions – could be convinced to depart from 
federal equal protection precedent, declare education a fundamental right, and subject 
school finance schemes to strict scrutiny.20  
Following this second wave strategy, in 1984, the Rodriguez plaintiffs filed 
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (Edgewood I).21  In addition to bringing 
an equity claim, this time under the Texas Constitution’s equal rights provision, the 
Edgewood I plaintiffs also challenged the school finance system under the “efficiency” 
mandate of the Texas education clause.22 Article VII, §1 of the Texas Constitution 
provides:  
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the 
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall 
be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and 
make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of 
an efficient system of public free schools. 
 
In a victory for plaintiffs, the Texas Supreme Court responded by striking down the 
school finance system as unconstitutional under the education clause,23 holding that 
“efficiency” required that districts “have substantially equal access to similar revenues 
per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.”24 The Court declined altogether to address 
plaintiffs’ claim under the equal protection clause, perhaps for many of the same reasons 
that had left the Supreme Court in Rodriguez so divided.25 
                                                 
20 This strategy proved successful in a handful of early cases, but was disappointing overall. For a 
comprehensive discussion, see Ryan, supra note 16 at  266-268. 
21 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (hereinafter Edgewood I). 
22 Id. at 392. 
23 Id. at 392. 
24 Id. at 397. 
25 See, e.g., Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 18 at 642 (explaining that “the fact that each school district serves 
both poor and wealthy kids, or both white and brown kids, muddles the [equal protection] claim that the 
discrimination is aimed at one identifiable group.”)  Other scholars have argued that federal and state courts 
13 
 Although the Texas Supreme Court relied on the education clause in Edgewood I, 
it explicitly struck down the school finance system under a theory of equity.26  The Court 
read the “efficiency” language in the Education Clause to demand “substantially equal 
access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.”27  Although this 
holding presages the idea that state education clauses contain a substantive component,28 
neither the Court nor the plaintiffs conceptualized the theory as one of adequacy.29  In 
fact, “adequacy” would not make its first appearance before the Texas Supreme Court 
until it was raised sua sponte by Justice Cornyn six years later in Edgewood IV.30 And 
plaintiffs themselves did not bring adequacy claims before the justices until 2005 when 
Neely reached the Texas Supreme Court.31 
This history in Texas underscores the extent to which adequacy litigation was 
shaped by its development from early equal protection claims based on school finance 
inequities.  In many ways, the litigation strategy was driven by innovative public interest 
lawyers navigating evolving doctrine.  Education reform litigation began with equity in 
                                                                                                                                                 
alike feared declaring education a fundamental right or poor students a suspect class would set the court 
down a slippery slope of litigation. 
26 Edgewood I at 397  Because the line between equity and adequacy is conceptually blurry, “adequacy” concerns 
“filtered through the court’s language” even though “Edgewood I dealt primarily with the equity issue.” Farr & 
Trachtenberg, supra note 16 at 645. 
27 Id. at 637. 
28 Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 16 at 645 (““The reason so many people were concerned with the inequities 
perpetuated by the Texas school-finance system is that the schoolchildren in the poorer districts received a 
substandard education.”). 
29 See e.g. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 16 at 644 (articulating the reasons why plaintiffs had rejected an 
“adequacy” claim in favor of “equity”). 
30See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 16-20(Tex. 1995) (hereinafter Edgewood IV).  The 
Texas Supreme Court struck down the public school finance system twice more in Edgewood II and Edgewood III. 
In Edgewood II, Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991), the Court unanimously 
dismissed the latest legislation as little more than a band-aid.  However, by Edgewood III, Carrollton-Farmers 
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex.1992), the Court’s 
unanimous front had begun to break under mounting political pressure.  Justice Cornyn limited the demands of 
equity by introducing the concept of adequacy: Districts need not have “substantially equal revenue for 
substantially equal tax effort at all levels of funding.” Instead, the State need only equalize resources up to a 
constitutional minimum – “a general diffusion of knowledge.” Wealthy districts remain free to supplement 
state funding with local funds as long as the entire system remains financially efficient.. 
31 See Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 176 S.W.3d 746, 753 (2005). 
14 
part because it started with the federal constitution. Although the large majority of state 
constitutions explicitly protect the right to an “adequate,” “thorough,”  or “efficient” 
education, not funding, early adequacy claims predominantly challenged specifically the 
school finance system, in large part because they were often bundled with equity 
challenges that had long focused on funding as the most strategic measure of equality.32 
Another reason for the initial focus on funding is the tradition of local control over 
education.33  Historically, a state’s major influence on schooling came from the provision 
of funds so it is not surprising that plaintiffs seeking systemic change would choose 
inequitable funding as an avenue to get at systemic, statewide problems.  The ultimate 
shift from equity litigation to adequacy litigation has been at times something of an ad 
hoc process, driven as much by the preferences of the bench as by education plaintiffs. 34 
 
C. The Third Wave: Kentucky and the Birth of Adequacy 
Scholars have labeled Kentucky the “birthplace” of the adequacy movement and 
the Third Wave of education litigation.   Just one year after the Rodriguez plaintiffs filed 
their lawsuit in Texas state court, a coalition of public school students, sixty-six local 
school districts, and a handful of Boards of Education in Kentucky followed with their 
                                                 
32 Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 109 (1995). 
33 The most recent decision in Oregon’s adequacy litigation signaled this concern.  In rejecting part of the 
plaintiffs adequacy claim as foreclosed by precedent, the Court cited Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 
1976), which found that while the Oregon Constitution “provides for a minimum of educational 
opportunities in the district,” it “permits the districts to exercise local control over what they desire, and can 
furnish, over the minimum.” Pendleton Sch. Dist. V. State, Multnomah Count Circuit Court No. 060302980 
A133649 at 8.  The Pendleton Court noted that beyond the basic “opportunities,” Olsen was not about 
adequacy but was merely a statement that the state constitution required some measure of uniformity of 
education.  Id. 
34 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 16 at 268-269 (“The shift in focus from equality to adequacy is in some cases 
a matter of choice or strategy, and in other cases it is a matter of necessity, as litigants who have already 
lost on an equality claim return to court for a  second or third time.”)  
15 
own suit.35  The education clause in Kentucky, like its counterpart in Texas, requires the 
General Assembly to provide an “efficient” system of public schools.36   Thus, as in 
Texas, plaintiffs in Rose v. Council for Better Education37 challenged the school finance 
system under not only the equal protection clause and due process clause, but also under 
the state constitution’s education clause.  In Kentucky, however, in addition to 
challenging the school finance system, the plaintiffs also claimed that the entire public 
school system was unconstitutional under §183’s “efficiency” mandate. In a landmark 
decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down the school system under the 
Education Clause of the Kentucky Constitution.  Aware of the revolutionary nature of its 
decision, the court made its holding as clear as possible: 
Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is that 
Kentucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitutional. 
…This decision applies to the entire sweep of the system -- all its 
parts and parcels. This decision applies to the statutes creating, 
implementing and financing the system and to all regulations, 
etc., pertaining thereto. This decision covers the creation of local 
school districts, school boards, and the Kentucky Department of 
Education to the Minimum Foundation Program and Power 
Equalization Program. It covers school construction and 
maintenance, teacher certification -- the whole gamut of the 
common school system in Kentucky.38 
 
Echoing the themes of equality running through earlier decisions, such as Edgewood I,39 
the Rose court held that, under §183, “[e]ach child, every child, in this Commonwealth 
must be provided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education.”40  But, by 
including the word “adequate,” the Court went even further, to hold that the education 
clause guaranteed not only equality, but also a certain quality of education.  Specifically, 
                                                 
35 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989).  
36 Ky. Const. § 183 
37 Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) 
38 Id. at 215.  
39 See, e.g. Edgewood I. 
40 Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (emphasis in the original). 
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the Court found a school system could only pass constitutional muster if  - at a minimum 
– it aimed to provide all children with the capacities it deemed necessary to enable 
students to “function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization’” “understand the 
[political] issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation;” and “compete 
favorably …in the job market.”41   
While its opinion went beyond merely thinking about education in terms 
of funding, the Court did specifically mandate that the General Assembly provide 
sufficient funding for an adequate education for all.  Significantly, the Court left 
the determination of how best to achieve a constitutionally efficient funding 
system to the legislature, emphasizing: 
We do not instruct the General Assembly to enact any specific 
legislation. We do not direct the members of the General 
Assembly to raise taxes. …We only determine the intent of the 
framers. Carrying-out that intent is the duty of the General 
Assembly. 42 
 
The General Assembly responded to Rose by immediately enacting sweeping reforms 
under the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA).43 
The Rose vision was subsequently adopted and cited by courts in at least seven 
other states.44  For example, in McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 45 a 
                                                 
41 Id. at 212 (“[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every child with at 
least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to 
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and 
political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) 
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in 
the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or 
preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose 
and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public 
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job 
market.”). 
42 Id. 
43 See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in Kentucky 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485 
(1999).  
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case discussed in greater depth in Part II.A, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
unequivocally held that children in the Commonwealth are constitutionally entitled to an 
education that will provide them with the seven capabilities set forth by the Kentucky 
Supreme Court in Rose, and that will prepare them to take their place as knowledgeable 
and productive citizens.  As in Kentucky, the Massachusetts legislature responded by 
rapidly enacting significant reforms that injected “enormous amounts of new money”46 
and “revolutionized public education in Massachusetts.”47    
Crucially, early cases such as Edgewood I, Rose, and McDuffy did not initially 
force courts to wrestle with the boundaries of the separation of powers doctrine.  Rather, 
those courts were able to trigger a legislative response while remaining well within the 
traditional bounds of judicial power: they declared the education system unconstitutional, 
defined the basic contours of the right to education, and left the legislature to devise 
reforms to bring the school system into compliance.  Most courts have followed this 
formula and left the specifics of reform up to their legislatures,48 unless and until a 
recalcitrant legislature or inadequate progress forces the court to play a more active role 
in the remedial stage.49   
                                                                                                                                                 
44 See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive 
Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997). 
See also Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 
1992); Opinion of Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 1993 Ala. LEXIS 441 (Ala. 1993); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 
v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, (N.C. 1997); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. 
v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535,  (S.C. 1999). 
45 415 Mass.545, 621, 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993) 
46 See Hancock v. Driscoll,  443 Mass. 428, 451 (2005) (quoting lower court). 
47 Hancock at 441. 
48 See Molly S. McUsic, Symposium: Brown at Fifty: The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the 
Public Schools 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1348 2004 (“State courts have been loath to clarify the full content of the 
rights they recognize or to prescribe for state legislatures the remedial steps necessary to bring the school 
funding system into constitutional compliance. The courts' most common course has been to declare the 
system unconstitutional and send it back to the legislature to make it constitutional.”) 
49 In some states, immediate resistance from the political branches have forced courts to play a more aggressive 
remedial role very early on.  See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the 
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II. GROWING JUSTICIABILITY CONCERNS: ADEQUACY LITIGATION FROM 2005-2007 
 The years 2005 through 2007 witnessed a sea change in judicial attitudes towards 
education adequacy claims.  Despite growing momentum, the benefit of lessons learned 
in previous litigation, favorable precedent and more sophisticated costing out 
methodologies, recent adequacy plaintiffs have almost universally encountered a 
judiciary reluctant to entertain their claims or to offer them meaningful remediation.50 A 
close reading of these recent opinions finds separation of powers concerns at their 
common core.  In order to find for plaintiffs in adequacy cases, judges perceived that they 
must intervene substantively in their state’s education policy to craft a remedy that would 
encroach on traditional legislative prerogatives. This is the broad umbrella under which 
fall many more concrete, situational concerns.  This Part takes up the recent set of 
adequacy decisions and identifies three interrelated factors within the umbrella of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kansas School Finance Litigation 54 KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1046-1047 (2006) (Describing how the legislature’s failure 
to fully comply provoked the Kansas Supreme Court to order a minimum increase in funding by a specific 
date.).   
50 Contrary to the dominant trend, plaintiffs prevailed in New Hampshire and Washington. However, even 
these two successes were somewhat qualified.  In Federal Way School District v. State of Washington, No. 06-2-
36840-1 KNT (Sup. Ct. 2007), the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on an extremely 
narrow claim under the state’s education clause.  Despite striking down a salary system not based on the cost of 
providing educational opportunity, the trial court goes to great pains to soften the impact of its ruling. The 
opening paragraphs note, “[T]his decision should in no way be construed to find or even suggest that the 
legislature has not provided for full funding of education in the Federal Way School District…If this decision is 
upheld by the Washington State Supreme Court it will be of little moment. The State legislature has been 
moving closer to equalization over the years and getting there will not require great effort.” In Londonderry School 
District v. State of New Hampshire, 154 N.H. 153 (2006), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the 
State had failed to define a constitutionally adequate education, as it had been ordered to do a decade earlier.  
Noting that “deference…has its limits,” the Court - for the first time – backed its decision with a deadline and 
warned that if the state failed to spell out enforceable and reviewable standards by the end of the fiscal year 
2007, a trial court or special master might have to do it for them. In this way, the Court added substantial bite 
to its earlier decision. Indeed, this was a victory for plaintiffs, who had been awaiting such a step since the 
Court first articulated the state’s duty back in 1993.  However, it is also important to note what the Court chose 
not to do. In Claremont School District v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997), the Court had ordered the state not only 
to define an adequate education, but also to 1) determine the cost, 2) fund it with constitutional taxes, and 3) 
“ensure its delivery through accountability.”  The Londonderry trial court found for plaintiffs on all three counts; 
but the Supreme Court affirmed only the first and stayed all other findings.  In addition to considering only one 
claim, the Court gave the state an entire year to take just that first step. The dissent criticized the majority for 
dancing around the core issue of adequate funding. 
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separation of powers that have contributed to the startling shift in the judicial response to 
adequacy lawsuits.  
First, while separation of powers concerns have always factored in education 
litigation, courts in earlier years could mandate reform without actively intervening in 
legislative decision-making. Initially, plaintiffs were fighting for legislative reform at the 
most basic levels. Legislatures had not yet been judicially required to meet certain 
standards in education funding.  Now, they must show that systems subjected to initial 
reforms, are still underfunded and/or wholly inadequate. When the claim is closer to 
legislative deficiency than legislative abdication, plaintiffs struggle to convince courts 
that there is a judicial role available that would not involve stepping into legislative 
shoes.  This remedial concern can also be characterized as a problem in the plaintiff’s 
proof of breach.  That judges are balking now, either at the question of breach or in 
envisioning an appropriate remedial role, where they once embraced education suits with 
a degree of fervor is in some ways a function of the adequacy movement’s past success in 
convincing judges to order legislative reforms.  Second, the increasing centrality of 
budgetary appropriations and pervasive use of costing out studies in adequacy cases has 
triggered perhaps the most fundamental separation of powers alarm for courts.  Costing 
out studies invite judges to review the spending levels set by the legislature – something 
they are extremely reluctant to do.  This concern is compounded in the adequacy context 
by the growing chorus of voices contending that the solution lies not in more money, but 
in such things as increased accountability, better management, and the flexibility to fire 
failing teachers.  Finally, when courts look to other states that have mandated specific 
appropriations or reforms, it is not clear to them that such intervention represents a long-
20 
term solution. They fear specific reforms will require repeated trips back to their 
courthouses for enforcement, if they can be enforced at all. The experience of sister states 
reinforces the conviction that courts’ power to enforce such remedies is tenuous in the 
face of legislative resistance. 
  
A. THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
By 2005, nearly a generation had passed since the first state courts recognized the 
constitutional right to education.  In the intervening years, as legislative appropriations 
failed to keep pace and temporary gains in educational justice were lost, parents and 
activists once again looked to the courts to protect the constitutional rights of their 
children in the face of political inaction.51 Such constitutional challenges to school 
systems in states that had already recognized both a qualitative right to education and the 
judiciary’s duty to uphold it make up the “Second Generation” of adequacy litigation52 
Paradoxically, the very successes of early adequacy plaintiffs in reforming grossly 
dysfunctional, unequal and inadequate school systems poses problems for second 
generation litigation.  A close reading of recent opinions reveals three primary ways in 
which the changing education landscape has heightened separation of powers concerns 
for courts adjudicating second generation cases.  First, courts are troubled by the 
increasingly intrusive remedial role seemingly demanded by school systems that have 
already undergone significant reforms. This failure to perceive an acceptable remedial 
role can lead courts to abdicate their function entirely in adequacy adjudication, 
                                                 
51In Young v. Williams, No. 03-00055/01152 (Cir. Ct., Div. II., Feb. 13, 2007), for example, the Council for 
Better Education filed suit again demanding that the Kentucky General Assembly deliver more quickly on the 
promises of Rose. 
52 See, e.g., Michael Rebell, Adequacy Cases are Alive and Well, available at 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/blog/2007/10/29/adequacy-cases-are-alive-and-well/.   
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essentially, if not overtly, reversing any positive precedent.   Second, signs of renewed 
political engagement and progress (however minimal) may cause courts to question the 
very legitimacy of judicial intervention. Over the years, a powerful strain of argument has 
developed maintaining that the judiciary should only engage in structural reform 
litigation in the face of egregious political neglect.53  In courts that subscribe to this view, 
plaintiffs will struggle to convince judges that anything more than perfunctory oversight 
on their part is constitutionally permitted, let alone necessary, when the legislature is also 
actively involved. Finally, improved schools further blur the already uncertain line 
delineating breach.  Where ambiguous constitutional standards and steadily improving 
conditions pose tricky line-drawing problems, courts are much more likely to defer to the 
judgment of the legislature.  The latest adequacy litigation in Massachusetts presents a 
striking example of the first two trends.   
 
i. New Remedial Challenges 
In 1993, Massachusetts became one of the earliest states to hold that its children 
were constitutionally entitled to an adequate education.  In McDuffy v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Educ., 54 the Massachusetts Supreme Court unanimously55 and 
unequivocally held that children in the Commonwealth are constitutionally entitled to an 
education that will provide them with the seven capabilities set forth by the Kentucky 
                                                 
53 See e.g. William A. Fletcher The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial 
Legitimacy 91 YALE L.J. 635, 694 (1982) (“The only legitimate basis for a …judge to take over the 
political function in devising or choosing a remedy in an institutional suit is the demonstrated unwillingness 
or incapacity of the political body”)  
54 415 Mass. 545 (1993). 
55 The lone dissenting voice, Justice O’Connor, dissented only on the question of breach. McDuffy at 621.. 
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Supreme Court in Rose,56 and prepare them to take their place as knowledgeable and 
productive citizens.57   
 Twelve years later, however, a second generation adequacy case produced a 
divided court58 newly skeptical of its own ability to remedy problems of inadequacy in 
education. In Hancock v. Driscoll, students from four of the state’s poorest public school 
districts revived the McDuffy case,59 alleging that their schools “continue[d] to suffer with 
largely the same conditions”60 existing prior to McDuffy, thereby depriving them of the 
education mandated by the Supreme Court.  The Hancock plaintiffs acknowledged that 
the 1993 education reforms had achieved a great deal, 61  but they argued that the state 
continued to leave some of its neediest children behind. 62   
Despite reaffirming McDuffy as binding precedent63 and finding that the 
Commonwealth had failed to achieve the objectives outlined therein,64 the Hancock 
plurality held for the defendants. In her plurality opinion, the Chief Justice denied 
plaintiffs relief not because she did not find a constitutional violation, but because she 
                                                 
56 See supra Part I. 
57 McDuffy at 606.. 
58 In Hancock v. Driscoll, seven justices wrote four separate opinions. The Chief Justice wrote for the plurality, 
joined by Justices Spina and Cordy, JJ. Justice Cowin concurred and was joined by Justice Sosman.  Justices 
Graeney and Ireland each wrote their own dissenting opinion. 
59 Hancock at 442. 
60 Id.  
61 McDuffy at 452.  
62 Hancock at 432.  
63 Five of the seven justices reaffirmed McDuffy: Chief Justice Marshall and Justices Spina, Cordy, Graeney, and 
Ireland. 
64 In their joint dissent, Justices Graeney and Ireland make clear their position that the state has clearly failed to 
achieve the McDuffy objectives. Although the plurality claimed to find no breach, the Chief Justice – writing for 
the plurality conceded that the “goals of education reform adopted since McDuffy have [clearly not] been fully 
achieved.”.In fact, she writes that, “[n]o one, including the defendants, disputes that serious inadequacies in 
public education remain.” She acknowledged that the state’s record of education reform since 1993 a“marred 
by areas of real and in some instances profound failure.” She further admitted that the “slow, sometimes 
painfully slow, pace of educational reform in the focus districts,” has maintained “sharp disparities in the 
educational opportunities, and the performance, of some Massachusetts school students.” She agreed with the 
Superior Court judge’s assessment that the failures are due – in part – to insufficient funding: “No one reading 
the judge’s report can be left with any doubt that the question is not ‘if’ more money is needed, but how 
much.”  
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could not identify an acceptable remedy.  In an opinion reflecting a full range of 
traditional justiciability concerns, the Chief Justice makes clear her discomfort with 
remedies she deems to be properly the province of concomitant branches of government. 
 At trial, the Superior Court judge had suggested two possible remedial paths: 1) to 
order the Department of Education “to determine the ‘actual cost’ of funding a 
‘constitutionally adequate level of education’ for all students in the focus districts,” and 
2) to order the Commonwealth “to implement the funding and administrative changes 
necessary to achieve that result.”65  The Chief Justice rejects both of these 
recommendations.  She explicitly refuses to order a costing out study “rife with policy 
choices that are properly the Legislature’s domain.”66  Further, she argues that the 
judiciary has neither the authority nor the competency to make such fundamentally 
political choices.67   And finally, as the costing-out study alone falls far short of a cure for 
failing schools, she warns of a slippery slope towards “forcing the Legislature to 
appropriate more money.”68 
 The Chief Justice’s remedial concerns underscore one major difficulty faced by 
courts in second generation adequacy cases. Whereas the court in McDuffy had deferred 
to the legislature to determine how to fulfill its Constitutional duty – finding these 
“details of implementation…best left, at least initially, to the executive and to the 
legislative branches of government” – persisting inadequacies would have required that 
                                                 
65 Hancock at  432. 
66 Id. at 460. 
67 Id. (“The study would assume, for example, that in order to fulfill its constitutional obligation under the 
education clause, the Commonwealth “must” provide free preschool for all three and four year old children “at 
risk” in the focus districts, and presumably throughout the Commonwealth thereafter. That is a policy decision 
for the Legislature….Other programs might be equally effective to address the needs of at risk students, such 
as remedial programs… nutrition and drug counseling programs, or programs to involve parents more directly 
in school affairs. Each choice embodies a value judgment; each carries a cost, in real, immediate tax dollars; and 
each choice is fundamentally political. Courts are not well positioned to make such decisions.”) 
68 Id. at 461. 
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the Hancock court offer more specific guidance on the substance of the right.  If a court 
perceives the state to be making a good faith effort to improve education, then issuing yet 
another declaratory judgment that the school system is unconstitutional becomes an 
empty formalism. The legislature need only respond by continuing to make its best effort 
to improve the system.  
 Faced with the prospect of finding a constitutional violation with no meaningful 
remedy, the McDuffy plurality ultimately held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that 
the Commonwealth had violated the state’s Education Clause.69  Although concurring in 
this result, Justice Cowan’s opinion criticizes the Chief Justice’s opinion as less-than-
honest.  He accuses her of “avoid[ing] the need to deal with McDuffy’s intrusive and 
flawed analysis,” by an “artful” rendition of “clear error” review. 70 In other words, 
Justice Cowan suggests that the plurality holding fails to find a clear breach of the 
constitutional duty, when, in fact their problem is with the court's own institutional 
competence to order a remedy:  
 
If the Chief Justice and those Justices who joined with her are concerned 
about a self-imposed position at the helm of this debate, they should reject 
much or all of McDuffy. If, on the other hand, they are comfortable with 
the prospect of determining whether the Commonwealth's educational 
reforms and expenditures have produced satisfactory results, they should 
accord the trial judge's findings and conclusions their due deference.71 
  
Justice Cowan here hints at the deeper tension running through Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion.   Although the Chief Justice never explicitly mentions “separation of powers” or 
“justiciability” in her opinion, those principles drive her decision. Forced to choose 
                                                 
69 Id. at 434. 
70 Id. at 468 (Cowin, Concurring)  
71 Id. at 469 (Cowin, Concurring).  
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between a more aggressive remedial stance and abdication of any role in adjudicating the 
education right, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts bows out by failing to find breach. 
 
ii. Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention 
Even had the most traditional of judicial remedies been available to the Hancock 
court, it is not clear that it would have been persuaded of its prerogative to intervene on 
behalf of Massachusetts’ children.  Like its counterparts across the country, the court’s 
tone of deference may reflect an additional concern: that courts lack the authority to 
intervene in education in the absence of a breakdown of the political process.72  Indeed, 
some scholars have argued that grievous deficiencies alone are not sufficient to trigger 
judicial action. Instead, the judiciary can only legitimately engage in structural reform 
when a government institution becomes “substantially immune from conventional 
political mechanisms of correction.”73 
In Hancock, the Chief Justice ‘s opinion points to the standard of legislative 
breakdown as the bar which must be met for judicial intervention.74  She determines 
whether the Commonwealth has met its duty by focusing not the quality of the education, 
but rather on whether the legislature’s action merits judicial intervention.  Rather than 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Neely at 789 (concluding that the constitutional standards could not “be used to fault a public 
education system that is working to meet [those] goals merely because it has not yet succeeded in doing so.”); 
Young at 15 (citing improving test scores and performance relative to neighboring states and concluding, 
“Given this progress, we are unwilling at this time to declare that the level of education funding in Kentucky is 
unconstitutionally inadequate.”); CCJEF at 40 (identifying complete abdication – such as total abolition of ESL 
programs - as the bar for legitimate judicial intervention) 
73 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1015, 1062 (2004); See also Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(noting that even if the plaintiffs established liability at trial, “the Court may not have been in a position to 
provide for more relief than simply encouraging continued effort and improvement by [the defendant]”). But 
See Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
74 See Hancock at 433, fn 2 (distinguishing judicial intervention in McDuffy as necessitated by the 
Commonwealth’s utter neglect: “[B]efore the enactment of the Education Reform Act of 1993 (act), many of 
the Commonwealth's children, notably poor children, urban children, children of color, and children with 
special needs were in essence systematically discarded educationally, with no obligation recognized by the 
Commonwealth to intervene on their behalf.”). 
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asking if the state is preparing the rich and poor in every city and town to “participate as 
free citizens,” she questions whether the Legislature “neglected or avoided a 
constitutional command”? Has it acted “in an arbitrary, non-responsive, or irrational way 
to meet the constitutional mandate”?75  Is it “presently neglecting or is likely to neglect 
its constitutional duties, thus requiring judicial intervention.”?76 After thus framing 
breach as a question of legislative engagement, she is able to find the education 
inadequate, but the legislature’s efforts sincere.  She concludes the court cannot offer 
relief: 
 
No one . . . disputes that serious inadequacies in public education remain. 
But the Commonwealth is moving systemically to address those 
deficiencies and continues to make education reform a fiscal priority. It is 
significant . . . that the Commonwealth has allocated billions of dollars for 
education reform since the act's passage . . . . By creating and 
implementing standardized Statewide criteria of  funding and oversight; 
by establishing objective competency goals and the means to measure 
progress toward those goals 3; by developing, and acting on, a plan to 
eliminate impediments to education based on property valuation, 
disability, lack of English proficiency, and racial or ethnic status; and by 
directing significant new resources to schools with the most dire needs, I 
cannot conclude that the Commonwealth currently is not meeting its 
constitutional charge to "cherish the interests of . . . public schools." Part 
II, c. 5, §2.77  
 
Justice Graeney, the sole justice on the Hancock Court to have participated in 
McDuffy twelve years earlier, interprets the Chief Justices’ opinion as effectively 
overruling McDuffy.78  Seizing on her use of the words “priority”, “commitment”, “plan,” 
and “progress” he criticizes her for interpreting the duty to educate as a duty that turns on 
“effort and not on results” – an emphasis he views as incompatible with McDuffy’s 
                                                 
75 Id. at 435 
76 Id. at 457 
77 Id. at 433-444 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. at 478, 485 (Graeney, J. dissenting). 
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holding.  In other words, children in the Commonwealth have only a right to an earnest 
legislature – one that is trying its best to provide an adequate education.  
Whether the Chief Justice’s opinion is read to guarantee a right to an adequate 
education (but, no remedy) or no such right at all (as the dissent would argue), the 
outcome here is the same: plaintiffs are denied relief as long as the legislature is deemed 
to be making a good faith effort to reform the school system.   
 As was the case in Massachusetts, many courts adjudicating second generation 
cases will find grievous failures in education despite no longer being confronted with 
inactive or inattentive legislatures.  The resulting separation of powers concerns threaten 
to drown out plaintiffs’ assertions that political activity is not the same as ensuring that a 
state achieves its constitutional duty towards children.     
 
iii. Uncertain Breach  
The final way in which political progress heightens separation of powers concerns in 
education adequacy suits is also the most obvious: as school conditions and the 
constitutional standard converge, courts are less certain whether there is a constitutional 
violation to be remedied in the first place. 
 Despite the sophistication of costing-out studies, adequacy still leaves courts 
without a consensus about the precise measurement of “adequate” funding or “adequate” 
education.  As Professor Peter Enrich writes: 
 
Faced with a constitutional provision mandating an 
indeterminate level of governmental activity, and demanding a 
commensurate and equally indeterminate (but very large) 
dedication of governmental resources, a court's most natural 
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inclination is to defer to the choices made by the political 
branches…79 
 
The question is naturally less daunting for courts when the level of funding or quality of 
education falls below any imaginably acceptable standard.  Thus, many early adequacy 
courts could intervene with moral certainty while at the same time not being forced to set 
a specific level of funding or quality. Whatever the constitutional standard, they could 
declare with confidence that the current education system fell short.80   
 As budgets have increased and schools improved, courts have faced more difficult 
factual scenarios in which levels of funding fell near, or within, the spectrum of plausible 
standards.81 In such situations, courts have seemed significantly less comfortable 
substituting their own judgment for that of the legislature on issues that push against the 
bounds of the separation of powers.82  
 
B. INCREASED FOCUS ON FUNDING LEVELS 
 Adequacy suits have always been about money,83 but recent cases suggest that 
appropriations pressures have now become one of the greatest stumbling blocks for 
courts as they consider their ability to respond to the claims of adequacy plaintiffs.  There 
                                                 
79 See Enrich supra note 32 at 171-172. 
80 See, e.g., Neely at 783 (“In Edgewood I and II, we did not find it necessary to articulate a standard of review; 
the public school finance system was simply not "efficient" by any stretch of the word.”); Young at 13 (“[Rose] 
was decided based upon evidence alleging that the Kentucky school system provided students a vastly inferior 
education, falling far short of ‘efficient.’”); Hancock at 452 (“In McDuffy, this court faced an overwhelming, 
stipulated body of evidence that the structure of public education in Massachusetts was condemning 
generations of public school students in our poorer communities to an inferior education. It was a record of 
abysmal failure.”). 
81See, e.g., Moore at 19-20 (discussing prior reforms to the school funding formula that directed more resources 
to the poorest districts.). 
82 See id. (finding school funding constitutionally adequate). 
83 See Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?  56 EMORY L.J. 
1613, 1614-1615. Edgewood I challenged the structural design of the school finance system that starved property-
poor districts for funds. In Rose, liability may have turned on the state’s failure to provide an adequate education, 
but the Court made it extremely clear that the state’s duty included the requisite funding for a constitutional 
education.   
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are three interrelated reasons why money has increasingly become a barrier to success in 
adequacy cases.  First, plaintiffs have focused more and more on levels of funding as the 
measure of adequacy in education, often to the exclusion of other elements that might be 
less tangible, but more easily approached by courts.  Second, costing-out studies have 
exacerbated this problem by focusing courts on specific dollar amounts.  Persuading 
courts to demand a specific budget from the legislature sets a higher separation of powers 
bar than asking for an indeterminate amount of increased funding in order to accomplish 
other specific objectives such as improved facilities.  Judges have refused repeatedly in 
recent years to interfere with legislative judgments about exactly how much money is 
enough.  Finally, the increased focus on money has engendered a countermovement 
arguing that money alone does not make a successful school.  This means that just at the 
time courts are being pointed towards money as a solution in adequacy cases, they are 
hearing loud arguments against the efficacy of such an remedy.  
 
i. Focused on Funding 
The particular separation of powers concerns stemming from adequacy’s focus on 
money have intensified in the past several years in part because of the evolution traced in 
Part I.  Because of their roots in equity, early adequacy claims focused on the structural 
aspects of school finance systems that systematically condemned students in poor school 
districts to an inadequate education.84 For example, the Edgewood I plaintiffs claimed 
that a school finance system heavily reliant on local property taxes violated not only the 
equal protection clause, but also the state right to education.85  As the litigation strategy 
evolved, however, plaintiffs began to challenge not the basic funding structure, but 
                                                 
84 See Enrich, supra note 32 at 109. 
85 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
30 
funding levels themselves.86  When an adequacy claim is structured around the level of 
funding, however, courts are forced to evaluate appropriations, the heart of the 
legislature’s domain, rather than considering the overall structure of school finance, an 
area in which a court could potentially intervene without overtly mandating increased 
expenditures. 
 Further cornering courts in the legislative domain, adequacy plaintiffs 
increasingly emphasize funding levels to the exclusion of broader challenges to the 
overall adequacy of the public school education.87  Kentucky is illustrative of this trend. 
In 2007 a Kentucky trial court dismissed adequacy claims expressly due to the nature of 
the plaintiffs’ claim.  In Young v. Williams, the plaintiffs had focused their pleadings 
specifically on the level of school funding, claiming it was both “inadequate and 
arbitrarily determined by the legislature.”88  On a motion for summary judgment, 
however, Judge Thomas Wingate of the Franklin Circuit Court denied the Young 
plaintiffs a chance to proceed to trial with their claim.  
 Significantly, in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
Young court did not disavow Rose, Kentucky’s landmark education case.  Instead, the 
opinion sought to reiterate Rose’s holding that only the judiciary can determine when a 
constitutional standard is met.  At the same time, however, Judge Wingate found that 
                                                 
86 See e.g. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. 176 S.W.3d 746, 753 (2005). 
87 See, e.g., Moore at 83, 173 (“The gravamen of this case…has been about funding.  Very limited testimony was 
presented about Kuspuk’s curriculum, its alignment with the State’s standards, the professional development 
available to its staff, the communities’ involvement in their schools, and the other components of its 
educational system. …[However], [t]he primary question in this case – whether the public education system in 
Alaska is constitutionally adequate – can not be framed solely in terms of funding, but must also address the 
opportunity for children to obtain an education.  Funding is just one component of the State’s public school system.”) (emphasis 
added); Neb Coalition for Ed. Equity & Adequacy v. Heinman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007) (noting that plaintiffs 
failed to allege at any point the negative impact of funding insufficiencies on the education received by students 
in the classroom.). 
88 Young v. Williams, No. 03-00055/01152 at 1 (Cir. Ct., Div. II., Feb. 13, 2007). 
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Young was a different case from Rose.   In Young, he wrote, plaintiffs “allege inadequate 
monetary expenditures, not an [inadequate] education system.”89 Thus, Judge Wingate 
reasoned, they “ask[] the court to exceed the rule from Rose by going beyond mere 
constitutional interpretation …[to] stipulate[e] the manner  by which the General 
Assembly must carry out its responsibilities.”90  Reinforcing this point, Judge Wingate’s 
opinion explicitly states that the plaintiffs could have survived summary judgment if only 
they had brought “appropriate claims” before the court, backed by a “fact pattern parallel 
to Rose.” It argued that courts are – and should be – “less willing to stretch [the] 
separation of powers” 91 for disputes over funding than for claims alleging a violation of 
the underlying right. Ultimately, Judge Wingate wrote, increased funding “must be the 
product of political will, not judicial decree.”92     
 Courts have also suggested that narrow claims of inadequate funding narrow the 
remedial options available to the court. For example, the plaintiffs in the most recent 
Texas adequacy case, Neely v. West Orange Cove Consol Independent School District, 
like those in Young, alleged only inadequate funding. The Texas Supreme Court denied 
them relief. In response to the dissent’s argument for a non-monetary remedy, the Neely 
majority responded: “[w]e are constrained by the arguments raised by the parties to 
address only issues of school finance.”  As these recent decisions in Texas and Kentucky 
show, the evolution of plaintiffs’ litigation strategies over the past decade has had the 
effect of pushing state courts ever closer to appropriations, an area where they are 
extremely loath to tread.  
                                                 
89 Id. at 13. 
90 Rose at 3 (emphasis added). 
91 Young at 12. 
92 Id. at 20. 
32 
ii. The Costs of Costing-Out  
 The salience of funding levels in education adequacy cases has also increased 
significantly with the advent of the “costing-out” study.  Even in cases closely replicating 
previously successful pleadings or with broader claims about the adequacy of education, 
costing-out studies have recently become a ubiquitous tool for plaintiffs wishing to give 
courts a concrete estimate of what it would take to achieve adequacy in their states.      
 First developed in 1997, a “costing out” study employs one of four methodologies 
to calculate the cost of providing a constitutionally adequate education to all children.93  
By quantifying “adequacy,” these studies offer a tangible benchmark for a somewhat 
nebulous constitutional standard. For example, in Young, all of the five costing-out 
studies concluded that appropriations for the 2001-2002 school year fell short by at least 
$740 million.  Similarly, the costing out study offered by the Neely plaintiffs concluded 
that the state must boost expenditures by a minimum of $1.653 billion.94 Thus, costing-
out studies have quickly become central to the core adequacy litigation strategy.95   
 The same power of the costing-out study to quantify a state’s failures in education 
also necessarily accentuates separation of powers concerns.  It shifts the focus of an 
                                                 
93 For a more comprehensive introduction to costing out studies (theory, methodologies, and utilization), see, 
e.g., Janet D. McDonald, Mary F. Hughes, & Gary W. Ritter, The Ben J. Altheimer Symposium; Education Funding at 
the Crossroads; Article: School Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 79 
(2004);  Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation, 56 EMORY L.J. 
1613, 1624 (2007); andEric A. Hanushek, The Alchemy of “Costing Out” an Adequate Education (Oct. 2005) (revised 
version paper prepared for the conference on Adequacy Lawsuits: Their Growing Impact on American 
Education), available at http:://www.uark.edu/ua/der/EWPA/Research/School Finance/1787.html. 
94 See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746, 769 (2005). 
95 See McDonald, supra note 93 at 93. (Describing how the first costing out study was conducted in Ohio by 
consultants Augenblick & Myers in 1997 and how over the next decade consultants were hired to conduct 
costing out studies in at least seventeen other states).  Indeed, at least one costing-out study was at issue in 
more than half of the nineteen cases examined in this article.  Plaintiffs offered costing-out studies not only in 
Young and Neely, but also in Moore v. State of Alaska, CCJEF v. Rell, Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Oklahoma 
Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058 (2007), Montoy v. State of Kansas, and CFE v. State of New York.  The plaintiffs requested 
the Court to order the state to conduct a costing-out study in Hancock and in Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State of 
Arizona, No. 04-0076 (Ariz. App. Nov. 22, 2006).  
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adequacy case from defining the contours of the constitutional right to arbitrating the 
underlying funding dispute.96  The former is quintessentially judicial.  The latter is a 
power explicitly granted to the political branches by most state constitutions.97 For this 
reason, under traditional separation of powers precepts, the judiciary is extremely 
reluctant to review – let alone mandate – appropriations.98   
 In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals demonstrated why using the costing-out 
study may create more problems than it solves.  Despite being initially sympathetic to 
adequacy plaintiffs claims, the court was extremely reluctant to interfere with the details 
of its legislature’s budgetary determinations.  In 2003, the Court of Appeals had found for 
the plaintiffs in their adequacy lawsuit, CFE II, and directed the state to reform the 
current school funding and accountability systems to ensure that “every school in New 
York City would have the resources necessary for providing the opportunity for a sound 
basic education.”99  This remedy, while not as explicit as some, seemed to demand a 
comprehensive overhaul of the state’s funding scheme.  In response, however, the 
Governor chose to adopt the lowest number generated by various possible methods of 
                                                 
96 The underlying funding dispute was underscored by competing costing out studies offered by the opposing 
parties. The study offered by plaintiffs concluded that Texas needed to increase school funding by $1.653 
billion to $6.171 billion in order to achieve 55% statewide pass rate on the state standardized test.   In contrast, 
the study offered by defendants concluded just $563 -$731 million in additional funds was necessary to achieve 
the same goal.  See Neely at 770.  Similarly, whereas the studies in Young uniformly concluded that “fulfilling 
Kentucky’s constitutional mandate toward education would require significantly more money than current 
funding levels,” they “disagreed as to the precise amount necessary.” Young at x. For the 2001-2002 school year, 
the various studies estimated Kentucky schools to be under-funded by as little as $740 million or as much as 
$2.3 billion.  See Young at 2. 
97 See, e.g., CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION, Art 4 § 16 (“The governor shall have power to disapprove of 
any item or items of any bill making appropriations of money . . . .”). 
98 See e.g. Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 2007 OK 30, P24 (Okla. 2007), quoting Calvey v. 
Daxon 2000 OK 17, 21 (footnotes omitted) (“This Court has no authority to consider the desirability, wisdom, 
or practicability of fiscal legislation.”); Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding et. al. v. Rell, p. 37 No. X 
09 CV 05 4019406 (CT Sup. Ct. 2007) (citing Rodriguez for the proposition that the judiciary should defer to the 
legislature on school finance issues as the court “lack[s] both the expertise and the familiarity with local 
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public 
revenues.”) 
99Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (2003).  
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estimating the state’s spending gap on education and proposed a program bill 
incorporating that methodology.100  
 In CFE III, plaintiffs returned to court to challenge the governor’s sum as 
insufficient to bring the state into compliance with the mandate of CFE II. At the end of 
an extensive fact-finding process, the lower court adopted the findings of an appointed 
panel of expert referees, concluding that New York was spending $5.63 billion less than 
was constitutionally necessary to provide a sound basic education.  
 In a huge blow to New York’s adequacy campaigners, however, the Court of 
Appeals rubber-stamped the Governor’s proposal, holding that the court’s job was merely 
to determine the rationality of the State’s proposed spending.101  Tellingly, the Court of 
Appeals opinion does little to define how a “rationality” test would work.  Instead, much 
like rational basis review in equal protection doctrine, the court suggests that if there is 
any way that the Legislature’s determination can be justified, then it will be viewed as 
rational.  Just how deferential the court’s opinion is becomes clear from a close reading.  
The majority opinion expends as much ink on its separation of powers concerns,102 and in 
articulating something akin to the restraint prescribed by the political question doctrine103 
as it does actually reviewing the State’s funding determination for reasonableness.    
 In making its determination, the Court of Appeals stressed that deference is 
“especially necessary where it is the State’s budget plan that is being questioned.” Thus, 
                                                 
100 The number the Governor chose was $1.93 billion. 
101 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 861 N.E.2d 50; 2006 NY Slip Op 8630, 8 (N.Y. 
2006) (“The role of the courts is not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine the best way to calculate the 
cost of a sound basic education in New York City schools, but to determine whether the State's proposed 
calculation of that cost is rational. Supreme Court should not have endorsed an examination in which the cost 
of a sound basic education in New York was calculated anew, when the state budget plan had already 
reasonably calculated that cost. In this respect, we agree with the Appellate Division.”). 
102 Id. at 58. 
103 Id. (“the manner by which the State addresses complex societal and governmental issues is a subject left to 
the discretion of the political branches of government”) (citations omitted). 
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the Court imposed a self-described “formidable burden” of proof on plaintiffs, 
emphasizing that a state financing scheme must be “patently irrational…before judicial 
deference will give way.”104  Just three years after mandating reform, the Court proved 
unwilling to interfere substantively with the spending determinations made by other 
branches of government.  
 Recent opinions from around the country echo the concerns of the CFE III court.  
In Massachusetts,  Justice Marshall cited the costing-out study as threatening to force her 
court down the slippery slope towards “forcing the Legislature to appropriate more 
money,”105 a step her concurring colleagues denounce as a patent violation of the 
separation of powers:  
Often, these disagreements about education concern how much 
money to spend and how best to spend it. The issue of public 
education is thus no different from our political controversies 
concerning whether we should invest more money in our public 
transportation system . . . and the amount we should provide in 
public assistance to low-income individuals and families. In 
other words, the controversy before us today is largely a funding 
debate. Choices regarding how much money to spend and how to 
spend it are in every instance political decisions left to the 
Legislature, to be arrived at with input from the executive branch 
and the citizenry; they should not be the result of judicial 
directives.106 
 
In Kentucky, the Young court refused to “substitute the [costing-out study’s] 
approximations…for the General Assembly’s actual appropriations,” characterizing 
                                                 
104 Id. at 58. 
105 Hancock at 460. 
106 Id. at 472. Even the Hancock dissent – which would have ordered a costing-out study – acknowledged the 
inherent separation of powers concerns involved in mandating appropriations: “I am well aware of the 
limitations that apply to unelected members of a court ordering an elected Legislature and executive to 
appropriate money and, frankly, the difficulties that might be encountered if it became necessary to enforce any 
orders against recalcitrant elected officials. The problem, of course, is magnified considerably when dealing 
with expenditures needed to fund public education; the need to allocate resources equitably between various 
school districts achieving at different levels; the complexity of education policy in general; and the disagreement 
between competent experts on how best to remediate a nonperforming or poorly performing school district.” 
Hancock at 484 (Graeney, J. dissenting). 
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plaintiffs requests for the court to “determine the adequacy of the specific amount of 
education funding,” as “ask[ing] the court to push the limits of separation of powers.” 107  
In Texas, the Supreme Court largely ignored the costing-out studies to which the District 
Court had accorded great weight in striking down current funding levels, emphasizing 
that legislatively-determined school funding levels should be deemed constitutional 
unless “arbitrary”.108 
 The costing-out study is undoubtedly a useful tool for making tangible the harm 
in an adequacy case and/or quantifying a proposed remedy, but it is increasingly a tool 
plaintiffs use at their own peril.  When combined with active legislatures, improved 
schools and ever-louder voices arguing that money (or money alone) will not solve 
education problems, the predominance of the costing-out study only confirms courts’ 
fears that they are being pushed firmly into the legislative territory of appropriations.  
Whereas earlier courts facing state-wide education crises might not have quibbled about 
stepping into the legislative zone to stir-up an inactive body or even suggesting particular 
appropriations, recent courts are no longer working in such a legislative vacuum.  For 
these courts, the costing-out study can trigger alarms by seeming to frame adequacy cases 
as suits about funding and nothing more.  Perhaps worse, they can provide an excuse for 
wary courts to avoid grappling further with the remedial challenges of modern adequacy 
suits.   
  
 
iii. Doubts That Money Alone is the Solution 
                                                 
107 Young at 14 (emphasis added). 
108 See Neely at 785.. 
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 The judiciary’s willingness to encroach traditional separation of powers 
boundaries has waned with their faith in the efficacy of money as a solution.  Adequacy’s 
initial success fueled a concerted counter-movement that has effectively cast doubt on the 
basic assumption that increased funding alone will improve academic performance.109  
This movement has produced literature and experts widely cited and called upon by 
defendants in adequacy cases.  No Child Left Behind reinforces the message that money 
doesn’t matter by sending a strong message to the judiciary that the nation’s most 
difficult education problems should be remedied by stronger accountability measures not 
increased spending.  
 Setting aside the validity of these claims, one thing is certain: the latest adequacy 
decisions reveal that the courts are, in fact, increasingly skeptical that increased funding 
will produce constitutionally adequate school systems.  Whereas in 1989 the Texas 
Supreme Court confidently declared, “[t]he amount of money spent on a student's 
education has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered that 
student,”110 its confidence soon faltered.  By 2005, the Court characterized the same 
relationship as “neither simple nor direct,” warning that while achievement “can and 
often does improve with greater resources…money does not guarantee better schools or 
more educated students.”111 Sharing in that sentiment, many courts have recently 
accorded great weight to the non-monetary barriers to academic success: financial 
mismanagement, lackluster school leadership, and environmental factors. 112 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND 
CONTROLLING COSTS (1994). 
110 See Edgewood I at 393. 
111 See Neely at 788. 
112 Trial courts in Arizona and South Carolina argue that increased expenditures will have little impact where 
children are exposed to a negative home environment. See Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State of Arizona No. 
04-0076 (Ariz. App. Nov. 22, 2006) and Abbeville v. State, 93-CP-31-0169, ¶ 9 (S.C. Ct. Common Pleas, 3d 
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Trial courts in Arizona and South Carolina refused plaintiffs’ plea for increased 
resources they believed would have little impact amidst a culture of poverty.  
Distinguishing plaintiffs’ claims of inadequate operations funding from an earlier 
adequacy victory on facilities funding, the court in Crane Elementary School District v. 
State of Arizona113 placed the blame for persistent failure on broken homes, not broken 
schools: 
 
Here, the underlying circumstances common to at-risk 
students that are predictors of poor performance, e.g., low 
parent participation and low self esteem, are not caused by 
the State’s educational funding system but are attributable 
to a dysfunctional home environment that, unlike 
deteriorating capital facilities, cannot easily be remedied by 
an influx of money.114 
 
Such creeping doubts about the efficacy of injecting more money into the education 
system only fortify the judiciary’s inclination to defer to legislative judgment.  In the case 
of Crane, the court declined to hold the state accountable for problems it argued it could 
no more solve than it could create. 
The South Carolina trial judge in Abbeville v. State also doubted that the school 
system could simply spend its way to success. In fact, he went so far as to suggest that the 
money thrown at failing schools had largely been wasted, partially because remedial 
efforts were vitiated by the forces of poverty and shattered families and partially because 
                                                                                                                                                 
Judicial Circuit 2005) (finding the “millions f dollars spent each year on the Plaintiffs Districts” have had no 
“appreciable impact” in student achievement due in part to mediating factors, such as prenatal factors, family 
status, divorce, frequent moving, and child rearing). The Supreme Court of Massachusetts suggested financial 
mismanagement and corruption are at the root of the education problem. See Hancock at 1157, n. 35 (noting 
that proposed remedies addressed only funding and not the “failing administrative and financial management 
that currently deprives students in the focus districts of the educational opportunities they deserve.”). The 
Alaska trial court also underscored the importance of non-monetary inputs. See Moore v. Alaska. 
113 Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State of Arizona, No. 04-0076 (Ariz. App. Nov. 22, 2006). 
114 Id. at 24. 
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the money came too late.115  For these reasons, instead of explicitly mandating more 
appropriations, the trial judge ordered South Carolina to provide preschool in the plaintiff 
districts – a remedy he hoped would mediate the environmental factors proven to leave 
kindergartners from poor families lagging behind their resource-richer peers. 
That the trial judge found any remedy at all, and particularly such a dramatic one, 
could be seen as a victory for the Abbeville plaintiffs.  The trial judge had been so 
reluctant to interfere with education funding that he initially dismissed plaintiffs’ 
adequacy claim as a non-justiciable political question. The Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the case, explicitly holding that it would be error to use “judicial restraint, 
separation of powers, and the political question doctrine as the basis for declining to 
decide the meaning of the education clause.”116  Nonetheless, when the trial judge 
eventually issued his ruling mandating preschool, the Abbeville plaintiffs did not see it as 
a victory.  They immediately filed a motion to alter or amend putting their teacher 
quality, curriculum, transportation, facilities and various other claims back before the 
court.  The claims were once again rejected by the trial judge, but the plaintiffs’ motion 
shows how far they viewed his order to be from the full funding reform remedy they 
sought.  
 Although the Supreme Court’s decision forced him to adjudicate the case, the trial 
judge’s later opinions indicate a continuing concern with judicial interference in this 
arena. While reluctant to interject itself into the legislature’s larger funding decisions, the 
trial judge responded to the Supreme Court’s demand that he hear the case by mandating 
preschool, a remedy that, although likely to necessitate some additional spending, leaves 
                                                 
115 See Abbeville v. State, 93-CP-31-0169, ¶ 431-433 (S.C. Ct. Common Pleas, 3d Judicial Circuit 2005)  
116 Id. at ¶ 9. 
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the legislature considerable discretion in shaping and implementing an early childhood 
program. Although not the pure legislative deference witnessed in New York, the South 
Carolina judge selected a remedy that would allow him to avoid the question of specific 
appropriations.  In fact, by choosing to mandate preschool rather than increased funding 
for the system as a whole, the judge in a sense echoed the earliest adequacy decisions that 
called for functioning school systems, but left the details to the legislature.  In order to 
respond to the commands of the Supreme Court while avoiding legislative prerogatives, 
the judge invented a remedy that brought him squarely back into comfortable judicial 
territory.  This type of creative yet cabined remedy can increasingly be expected of trial 
judges skeptical of interfering with legislative budgetary allocations.  
 In the 2007 case, Moore v. State, an Alaska trial court similarly ordered a non-
monetary remedy in lieu of the statewide funding reform sought by plaintiffs.  Although 
the trial court found not only that the state’s “achievement gap” was a serious concern,117 
but also that the education provided in at least one district was so deficient as to make it a 
violation of substantive due process to require its students to pass the statewide exam in 
order to receive their high school diplomas,118 it concluded that Plaintiffs proved neither 
that current funding was constitutionally inadequate nor that an increase of funding 
would remedy the existing achievement gap in the state.119  Suggesting that local school 
districts had failed to spend existing funds in the best interest of their students,120 the 
court directed the legislature to step up its oversight of the system and to ensure better 
accountability.  In reasoning resonant with the logic of No Child Left Behind, the court 
                                                 
117 Moore et al. v. Alaska, 3AN-04-9756 Civil at Conclusions of Law, Part I ¶ 19. 
118 Id. at Conclusions of Law, Part II. 
119 Id. at ¶¶ 17-20. 
120 Id. at ¶ 287. 
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determined that the state was failing to meet its constitutional mandate not for lack of 
funding, but due to a failure of adequate oversight. 
  These recent opinions in Arizona, South Carolina and Alaska demonstrate three 
possible responses to education suits.  Ranging from total rejection of plaintiffs’ claims, 
to a highly specific yet cabined remedy, to the vague command to “increase oversight,” 
they have in common the sense that money will not solve a state’s education problems.  
While courts may respond, as did the Arizona court, by placing blame on parents rather 
than the state, or, as did South Carolina and Alaska, by searching out a remedy that 
avoids an overt mandate of increased spending, their skepticism about whether money 
will solve problems contributes to the sense that the legislature is best positioned to 
address modern education problems. 
 At a broader level, the cases in this section show how important innovative 
remedial proposals will be to the future success of education reform litigation.  By 
focusing on funding, plaintiffs may open a window for unsympathetic courts to exempt 
themselves altogether from the process of reform.  Even the more engaged courts may 
draw the line of intervention at specific budgetary allocations.  Thus, when adequacy 
plaintiffs do not offer remedies that are not overtly monetary, they may end up with a 
court that decides to defer to legislative budget numbers or with a non-responsive 
remedy. 
 
C. LESSONS FROM ADEQUACY CASES ACROSS THE COUNTRY 
Finally, adequacy decisions delivered between 2005 and 2008 reflect significant 
changes in the larger national landscape. In the previous sections this Article showed 
courts to be increasingly pushed – by maturing cases and litigation strategies – towards 
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mandating appropriations, a remedy with which they were increasingly uncomfortable.  
This section adds the backdrop: By 2005 courts had to weigh this uncertain justice 
against the risk that their actions would begin a losing battle with the state legislature, or 
that, at best, judicial interference would only contribute to the kind of mixed results seen 
over the years in their own and other states.  
In the early adequacy cases, courts were exploring new territory. They recognized 
separation of powers tensions from the very beginning, but they also saw the many ways 
in which education is sui generis.  As a state’s single affirmative constitutional duty, 
education is elevated in state constitutions, as it is in American life.  In response to early 
rulings, legislatures could not, and did not reject outright the judiciary’s insistence that 
they provide an adequate education for all children.  
By 2007, plaintiffs had litigated adequacy cases in 35 states.  As discussed in Part 
I, many of the judicial decisions served as catalysts for immediate sweeping education 
reform.  In a handful of states, however, staunch political opposition forced courts to play 
a more active role in the remediation stage, straining the allocation of power among the 
branches and ultimately shaking judicial commitment to protecting the constitutional 
right.121 
These struggles during the 1990s portend for today’s judges what may be at stake 
when they preside over adequacy litigation. The history of education litigation in Texas is 
particularly illustrative of what courts may fear when they contemplate becoming deeply 
involved in an education remedy.  The Texas Supreme Court began its intervention in the 
state’s failing education system committed to the constitutional guarantee and to 
                                                 
121 See Rebell, supra note 1 at 1528-1529 (Citing instances of excessive delay and resistance by political branches 
that – in states like  Ohio and Alabama – ultimately led courts to retreat). 
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requiring the reforms necessary to fulfill that guarantee.  When the Court unanimously 
struck down the state’s school finance system in 1989 in Edgewood I, it called for 
sweeping legislative action, warning, “[a] band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must 
be changed.”122  Two years later, in Edgewood II, the Court continued to press Texas to 
meet its duty to schoolchildren.  The Court unanimously struck down the public school 
finance system a second time, dismissing the latest legislation as wholly insufficient: 
“The fundamental flaw …lies not in any particular provisions but in its overall failure to 
restructure the system.”.123   Four months later, the legislature enacted new legislation, 
modeled closely on prescriptive judicial advice.124 Not yet satisfied, however, the Court 
rejected the legislature’s effort yet again in Edgewood III, decided in January of 1992.   
The Texas Supreme Court accompanied each of its decisions with an unbending 
injunction threatening to shut down the public school system if the legislature failed to 
pass constitutional legislation by the designated deadline. By Edgewood III, however, the 
court’s unanimous front began to break under mounting pushback from the legislature.125  
Finally, in Edgewood IV – facing the legislature’s threat to strip its jurisdiction126 – the 
Court declared the school finance system constitutional. 
                                                 
122 Id. at 397. 
123 Edgewood II at 16. (emphasis added) The Supreme Court actually reversed the district court’s decision to 
vacate the injunction “on the equitable grounds of deference to the Legislature.” 
124 This advice was not-so-subtly slipped into an unnecessary opinion denying a rehearing.  Justice Doggett 
wrote a concurrence criticizing this inappropriate use of the opinion denying a rehearing to “influence the final 
stages of current legislative deliberations.” Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). 
125 In his dissent, Justice Mauzy – who had written the Edgewood I decision – wrote, “In two prior opinions on 
this same case, the court worked together to follow the rather clear command of the Constitution without 
regard to the political consequences of its decision. Through compromise and consensus-building, the court 
spoke with one firm voice in what many have recognized as the most important case it has ever considered. 
Tragically, this has all been lost.” Edgewood III at 539 (Mauzy, J., dissenting). 
126 See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 25 at 702 (“Had it struck down Senate Bill 7, there might have been a 
revolt in the Legislature, particularly among the legislative leaders who had invested so much into the creation 
of the law. House leader Libby Linebarger surmised that, had the court declared Senate Bill 7 unconstitutional, 
the Culberson amendment would have passed, sharply restricting the court's jurisdiction over education-related 
issues.”). 
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By the account of the four dissenting justices, Edgewood IV was the result of a 
capitulation to political pressure. They denied that anything substantive had changed 
since the Court’s ruling in Edgewood I.  Writing for the dissent, Justice Hecht explained: 
 
Today, despite the Court’s admonition that systemic change is essential, 
made in Edgewood I, and repeated in Edgewood II, and the Legislature’s 
three opportunities in as many years to comply with constitutional 
requirements, the basic system with its fundamental flaws remain intact.127 
 
 And, by the majority’s own admission, its dramatic departure from former precedent was 
motivated by the need to escape the “judicial purgatory where we must hear the same 
case over and over.”128  This claim, first expressed by Justice Cornyn in his one-justice 
dissent in Edgewood III, was adopted by the majority in Edgewood IV129 perhaps because 
it promised a graceful exit from a situation that had become untenable due to political 
pressure. 
 This epic battle left its mark on the Texas judiciary long after its final Edgewood 
decision.  Although by the time Neely v. West Orange Cove Consol Independent School 
District reached the Texas Supreme Court in December of 2005, only Justice Hecht 
remained on the court from the Edgewood cases, his experience clearly informed the 
court’s response to Neeley.  Now writing for the Neeley majority, Justice Hecht 
vigorously defended the Court’s duty to determine the constitutionality of the public 
school system.  At the same time, he ultimately engaged in the inquiry with pronounced 
deference to the legislature.  Bound by the lower court’s factual findings, Justice Hecht 
                                                 
127 Edgewood IV at 760. 
128Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 526 (Tex. 
1992).  
129 See Edgewood IV at 766 (Spector, J. dissenting).  
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reversed the lower court’s holding by taking the teeth out of the standards applied.130  He 
ruled that in addition to proving that the system is [currently] not producing a general 
diffusion of knowledge, the plaintiffs must prove that it is incapable of doing so.131 Not 
surprisingly, the plaintiffs failed to meet a burden of proof that was, by the court’s own 
admission, “very deferential to the Legislature.”132  Thus, although the Court recognized 
serious deficiencies in education – including “wide gaps in performance amongst student 
groups differentiated by race, proficiency in English, and economic advantage” 133 – it 
determined that “those deficiencies do not amount to a violation of [the Texas Education 
Clause]”.134  
 This long saga in Texas, and similar experiences in a handful of other states135 
have undoubtedly influenced subsequent courts trying adequacy cases.  This is not 
surprising since state courts are especially likely to value the experience of sister 
jurisdictions when faced with novel constitutional claims and new remedial challenges 
not addressed by the federal courts.136 At the same time, it means that over time, a few 
                                                 
130 While the Texas Supreme Court adopted the duty articulated by the District Court - that a constitutional 
school system must provide all students “with a meaningful opportunity to acquire the essential knowledge and 
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134 Id. at 754.  
135 See Rebell, supra notes 1 & 121. 
136 See William S. Koksi, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Education Policy Reform Litigation, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1077, 1226 (2004) (“What affects state supreme court decision-making in educational finance reform 
litigation? From a formal legal viewpoint, judicial decision-making in school finance reform cases, like all 
judicial decision-making, should be based on a straightforward application of the law to the facts of the case. 
But the law is hardly determinative in educational finance reform cases. Many of these cases are cases of first 
impression in which a state's high court is interpreting vague and century-old state constitutional language. Law 
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notable failures may have a disproportionate impact on judges dealing with later 
litigation.  
For example, in 2006, the Kansas Supreme Court foreclosed further adequacy 
litigation explicitly to avoid the fate of its sister states.137 In Montoy v. State of Kansas, 
the Court “elect[ed] …to end th[e] litigation,”138 despite lingering doubts about whether 
the legislature had successfully created a constitutional school finance system.139  In one 
prong of its decision, the Court held that it could not properly determine the 
constitutionality of recently-passed legislation that had made changes to the school 
finance system.  It deemed the changes significant enough to require that the plaintiffs 
amend their complaint in order to continue to properly challenge the system.  In the 
second prong, after surveying the progression of adequacy suits in sixteen sister states, 
the Court declined to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to properly challenge the 
constitutionality of the “new” school finance system. The Court offered the experiences 
of New Jersey, Arkansas, and Texas as empirical evidence that remanding to the trial 
court tends to delays success in the face of continued litigation. Thus, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the case, concluding that “a constitutional challenge…must wait for another 
day”.140  
                                                                                                                                                 
and legal precedent being of limited explanatory value, this study looks outside the law for influences on 
judicial decision-making.”). 
137 Montoy v. Kansas, 282 Kan. 9 (2006).  
138 Id. at 25. 
139 Id. Finding that the most recent legislation “so fundamentally altered the school funding formula that the 
school finance formula that was at issue in this case no longer exists,” the Court held it could not determine the 
constitutionality of such without further fact-finding by a lower court.  At the same time, the court refused to 
remand to the district court to allow plaintiffs to amend their pleading to challenge the new funding formula. 
Thus, the court provided no substantive response to plaintiffs’ claims that the amended legislation still failed to 
pass constitutional muster. 
140 Two dissenting judges criticize the majority for “graft[ing] a ‘good enough for government work’ phrase” 
onto Article 6 §6 of our state constitution”. Id. at 35. 
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Courts in other states have used a similar rationale for rejecting adequacy suits or 
denying relief.  In Hancock, for example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts pointed to 
the other states, this time New Jersey and New York, as evidence for why it should stay 
its hand in 2005.  Likewise, in 2007, the Alaska trial court in Moore pointed to Arkansas’ 
experience as “illustrative” of why it should deny plaintiffs claims of inadequate 
funding.141  
In still other states, courts have explicitly cited recent experiences from around 
the country as grounds for avoiding adequacy litigation altogether.  In dismissing 
plaintiffs claims as non-justiciable in their 2007 case, Nebraska Coalition for Ed Equity 
& Adequacy v. Heinman, the Nebraska Supreme Court went out of its way to chastise 
state courts that foolishly took up what it deemed to be a prohibited political question:  
 
The landscape is littered with courts that have been bogged down in the 
legal quicksand of continuous litigation and challenges to their states' 
school funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into that 
Stygian swamp.142 
 
The court followed with a scathing critique of its peers in Arkansas, Texas, Alabama, and 
New Jersey for mistakenly believing the judicial branch could bring meaningful 
resolution and reform to school finance systems.  In particular, the court minced no words 
in rebuking the New Jersey courts for nearly 25 years of school finance litigation, saying, 
“[t]he volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example 
of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a Legislature."143  
Whether courts explicitly acknowledged their influence or not, the landscape of 
prior education litigation across the country and its aftermath cannot help but have 
                                                 
141 Moore v. Alaska, No. 3AN-04-9756 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 2007).  
142 Neb. Coalition for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 557 (Neb. 2007)   
143 Id.  
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informed all cases decided between 2005 and 2008.  It is not coincidental that in each and 
every instance where the question of adequacy was one of first impression, courts 
between 2005 and 2008 dismissed plaintiffs’ claims.  To put this in perspective, consider 
that at least four courts have dismissed adequacy claims on grounds of justiciability in the 
past three years,144 whereas only five courts had done so in the preceding 16. 145   
 A closer look at each of these recent dismissals, reveals judges deeply concerned 
about their institutional competence to deal with the questions presented, a worry that 
seems to be reinforced by the similar skepticism coming out of other state courts. For 
example, in Oklahoma Education Association v. State, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that the state had failed to adequately fund the public school 
system as a non-justiciable political question.  The court reprimanded plaintiffs for 
“attempting to circumvent the legislative process by …[ask]ing … this Court to invade 
the Legislature’s power to determine policy,” and concluded, “This we are 
constitutionally prohibited from doing.”146  Likewise, the Indiana trial court in Bonner v. 
Daniel delivered an extremely brief opinion dismissing plaintiffs’ claims as contrary to 
separation of powers doctrine.147   
                                                 
144 See Labato v. Colorado, No. 05 CV 4794 (2005); Bonner v. Daniels, No. 49D01604PL016414 (Ind. 2007); 
Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058 (2007); Nebraska Coalition for Ed 
Equity & Adequacy v. Heinman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007).  As is described in greater detail below, many 
other cases were dismissed for justiciability concerns, if not explicitly on justiciability grounds See, e.g., Carroll 
Hall v. Rell , No. X 09 CV 05 4019406 (Conn. 2007); Young v. Williams, No. 03-00055/01152 (Ky. Cir. Ct., 
Div. II., Feb. 13, 2007).  Plaintiffs claims in Pendleton School District 16R et al. v. State of Oregon et al. (2007) were 
dismissed in October 2007.  There is a dispute as to whether this case was dismissed on grounds of justiciability 
or due to failure to state a claim as the trial court chose to give the verdict from the bench without issuing a 
written judicial decision.  The case is now on appeal. 
145 See Ex Parte James 836 So.2d 813 (Ala. 2002); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999); Coalition 
for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inv. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Committee for 
Educational Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.e.2d 1178 (Il. 1996); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995). 
146 Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066 (2007) 
147 Bonner v. Daniels, No. 49D01604PL016414, 4 (2007) 
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Similarly, the plaintiffs claims in Labato v. State of Colorado were dismissed on 
justiciability grounds in 2006.  Notably, the Colorado Supreme Court had previously 
adjudicated a constitutional challenge to the education system.  In an equal protection suit 
- Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. Of Educ. 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) – the Court had 
“interpreted the state’s Education Clause and applied its interpretation to the public 
school finance system.”148  Although asked to do the same for the very same provision, 
the Labato trial court drew a bright line between equal and adequate opportunity claims, 
and dismissed the latter as a political question to be addressed by the legislature.149 
And finally, in September 2007, a Connecticut trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ 
claims to “suitable” educational opportunity in a pre-trial motion.  Judge Shortall clearly 
shared many of the concerns expressed by his peers in Nebraska, Oklahoma, Indiana, and 
Colorado. However, bound by precedent from the state’s highest court on the 
justiciability of such cases, he could not follow their lead.  Thus constrained, Judge 
Shortall technically faulted plaintiffs for failure to state a claim in a thinly veiled 
justiciability decision.  The judge imported his concerns about the proper role of the 
judiciary into the analysis under the title, “prudential cautions.”150 Judge Shorthall 
claimed his “prudential cautions” concerns were part of the Geisler test traditionally 
employed by Connecticut courts to construe the contours of a state constitutional right.151 
                                                 
148 Quoting from Appellants’ Opening Brief, available at 2006 WL 4082602.  
149 “Despite Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Colorado Supreme Court has exercised jurisdiction over Education 
Clause claims, these cases presented constitutional questions of equality, not quality or adequacy of educational 
funding.  In fact, no Colorado court has defined “adequate’ or “thorough” because the substance of these 
terms is a legislative determination.” Labato at 2. 
150 CCJEF at 37. (“While the court has rejected the state’s argument that the questions raised by plaintiffs are 
not justiciable, it cannot ignore the ‘prudential cautions [which shed light on the proper definition of 
constitutional rights and remedies]”).  
151 See State v. Geisler 222 Conn. 672, 685-686 (1992) (citations omitted) (Specifying six “tools of 
analysis” to be considered in construing the contours of the Connecticut Constitution: “(1) the textual 
approach, (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court ,(3) federal precedent, (4) sister state 
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A close reading of his opinion shows, however, that his  “prudential cautions” map 
perfectly onto the classic justiciability case, Baker v. Carr.152 Further, neither Geisler –
nor any case before or after - introduces a justiciability analysis as a step in defining the 
contours of a constitutional right.153  Judge Shortall’s strange manipulation of the Geisler 
test therefore suggests that, as in other states recently dismissing adequacy suits, 
justiciability concerns actually drove the Judge’s decision.154  
                                                                                                                                                 
decisions or sibling approach, (5) the historical approach, including the historical constitutional setting and 
the debates of the framers, and (6) economic/sociological considerations.”). 
152 The Court’s arguments map onto the Baker v. Carr criteria as follows: 1) A textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to coordinate political department (“The holders of public office at 
both [the state and regional] levels and in both the executive and legislative branches of government have the 
constitutional responsibility to determine what is necessary to provide a free and substantially equal educational 
opportunity… Courts “must resist the temptation…to enhance [their]own constitutional authority by 
trespassing upon an area clearly reserved as the prerogative of a coordinate branch of government.’” Carroll-
Hall at 35 (citing Pellegrino v. O’Neill, 193 Conn. 681); 2) The lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving the issue (“In order to determine whether the allegations of the complaint are true, the 
court would have to receive evidence concerning and determine such questions as, ‘What is a ‘high quality 
preschool?’; ‘What are ‘appropriate class sizes?’;… What makes up a ‘rigorous curriculum with a wide breath of 
courses?’…Stating explicitly what is implicit in the plaintiffs’ argument makes it plain how far afield from the 
courts’ constitutional function of hearing and deciding cases their complaint would take the court.” Id. at 35-37; 
3) The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion (“[M]any and varied issues of educational policy…are involved in defining a ‘substantive’ level of 
educational opportunity…[D]ecisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to Horton I demonstrate that Court’s 
reluctance to insert itself into educational policy decisions in the absence of clear constitutional or legislative 
authority to do so.” Id. at 18-19; and 4) The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government/without disregarding 
legislature’s exclusive authority. (“An examination of the complaint in this case makes it evident how deep an 
intrustion by the court into the constitutional prerogatives of the other branches of state government, to say 
nothing of local boards of education, would be necessary to grant plaintiffs the relief they seek.” Id. at 35. 
153 Judge Shorthall’s decision would have been telling had it merely attempted to masquerade justiciability 
concerns as “prudential cautions.”  However, “prudential cautions” – let alone justiciability – are not, in fact, a 
part of the traditional test used to define the contours of a constitutional right. The precedent cited by Judge 
Shorthall identified “economic/sociological considerations,” not prudential cautions, as the sixth tool of a 
constitutional rights analysis.153 Moreover, the tool is not just different in name. “Economic/sociological 
considerations” in the Geisler inquiry instructs courts to recognize constitutional prohibitions even beyond the 
letter of the constitutional provisions themselves, when allowing the act would – in practice – undermine the 
core right.  For example, in Geisler, the Supreme Court of Connecticut construed the exclusionary rule broadly 
to exclude all evidence derived from an unlawful warrantless entry into the home – including evidence obtained 
while the defendant is in lawful custody outside of the home – to eliminate incentives for the police to conduct 
unconstitutional search and seizures. 
154 Importantly, only the decisions in Oklahoma and Nebraska were final decisions before the state’s highest 
court.  Each of the other cases – in Indiana, Colorado, Connecticut, and Oregon - is being appealed. Future 
appellate court decisions may very well direct reluctant lower courts to take on these daunting cases - as they 
have in the past. See, e.g., Abbeville, 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.E.2d 535 (1999); Poehling v. Idaho State Board of 
Education, 850 P.2d 724 (1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 635 A.2d 1375 (1993); 
Montoy v. State, 275 Kan. 145, 62 P.3d 228 (2003). 
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CONCLUSION: MOVING BEYOND JUSTICIABILITY 
  
 The recent shift in outcomes for adequacy plaintiffs this Article describes – 
towards judicial restraint at the remedial phase, findings of non-justiciability, and 
deference to legislative budget allocations – is instructive for those who look to the courts 
to fight for children in failing schools.  The affirmative state right to education is a vital 
tool precisely because of the tendency of majority politics to leave behind the voiceless. 
Children growing up with grossly inadequate educational opportunities are exactly those 
citizens whom courts must protect.  This paper has shown that continuing to tread the 
paths carved and refined by three decades of adequacy litigation has ceased to bring 
plaintiffs closer to the goal of producing tangible improvements for those children.  
Rather than producing desperately needed change in state education policy, the most 
recent adequacy litigation has encountered mounting resistance and fueled separation of 
powers fears that may ultimately leave the courts altogether unwilling to intervene in the 
area of education. In doing so, it is jeopardizing the very right that extends so much 
promise to this country’s children, no matter their race or socioeconomic background.  
Modern adequacy litigation – as we know it - may have run its course.   
 But, all is not lost. To the contrary, this precarious situation gives education 
advocates a mandate to think critically about the past evolution of the adequacy litigation 
strategy and creatively about the way forward. Courts have shown themselves reluctant to 
wholly relinquish their authority to adjudicate the education right and generally have not 
done so to this point.   
One thing recent decisions make clear is that plaintiffs must find a way to 
recharacterize both the right and the remedy so that they cannot be boiled down to a 
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demand for increased funding.  Scholars and courts have already begun to explore a 
handful of legally and politically plausible non-monetary alternatives.  The recent South 
Carolina decision suggests one way forward.155  Because early education programs have 
been shown to nearly guarantee a boost in at-risk academic achievement while leaving 
the legislature and localities with significant discretion in how to structure such a 
program, universal preschool is a particularly appealing non-monetary remedy.156   That 
the South Carolina court elected to adopt a remedy of mandatory preschool shows how 
realistic an option it is to structure future litigation around such non-monetary remedial 
requests.  At the same time, universal preschool is certainly not the only possible remedy 
that could avoid throwing courts directly into the arena of appropriations.  This example 
hints at a whole universe of cases that might target critical elements of an adequate 
education.   
 Non-monetary remedies need not be incremental. In fact, one of the boldest 
proposals to date steers clear of the legislature’s power of the purse while arguing for 
drastic reform.  Professor James Ryan has made the case that the education clauses 
enshrined in state constitutions guarantee children the right to a socio-economically 
integrated education.157  Similarly, others have argued that an “adequate” education 
requires carefully targeted school choice.158 
 Finally, courts may be able to avoid directing fiscal and educational policy by 
instead focusing on the process by which that policy is determined.  Many scholars have 
                                                 
155 See supra, Section 
B. Increased focus on Funding Levels.  
156 See e.g. James E. Ryan,  A Constitutional Right to Preschool 94 Calif. L. Rev. 49 (2006) 
157 See e.g. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249 (1999); Christopher E. Adams, Is 
Economic Integration in the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation? 56 Emory L.J. 1613 (2007) 
158 See e.g. Crawford v. Davy Docket No. C-137-06 (Sup. Ct. 2007) 
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proposed the judiciary play a role more akin to a “catalyst” or “backstop” than “dictator” 
in structural reform litigation.159 The most recent Wyoming decision provides an initial 
sense of what a process-focused remedial role might look like in the education context.160 
Identifying new litigation strategies that can work in the present climate will not 
be easy.  Courts’ separation of powers concerns are deeply-rooted and their relationships 
with their legislatures are complex. Structural reform litigation to some extent will 
inevitably demand that courts take an unusually active role in crafting a remedy. In trying 
to give wide berth to the legislature’s spending power, courts may risk encroaching on 
the prerogative of local control.  However, unless courts are presented with avenues for 
remediation that do not force them to encroach on the legislature’s appropriations 
prerogative, they may allow the right to erode irrevocably by paying it lip service while 
abdicating their role in guaranteeing its substance.   
 There is another, perhaps an equally compelling reason for plaintiffs to look away 
from funding at this juncture.  Whereas when equity suits first pressed for increased 
school funding, the lack of money was by far the greatest barrier to an adequate 
education, today this is no longer the case.  Although adequate funding is undoubtedly 
one part of providing adequate educational opportunity, experience has taught that money 
                                                 
159 See e.g. Susan Sturm Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons 
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 805 (1990) 
160 Campbell County School District v. State of Wyoming 2008 WY 2 (2008) In 2001, the Supreme Court 
handed down a very detailed remedy.  It instructed the legislature not only in the factors they needed to 
take into consideration in creating the formula used to calculate the cost of a constitutional education, but it 
also mandated explicit levels of funding for Kindergarten and Capital Construction.  By contrast, in 2008, 
in deciding whether or not the legislature had fully complied, the Court looked – at times - to the process by 
which the legislature had decided on its course of action and the facts that informed its decisions. For 
example, the court’s assessment of the sufficiency of funding for at-risk students turned on the fact that the 
“state [had] exerted significant effort to develop a fair and accurate method of estimating the additional cost 
of addressing at-risk students.” Similarly, the Court upheld the level of funding for small schools because 




alone will never be enough to guarantee that such opportunities are present.  For both 
normative and strategic reasons, then, it is vital that adequacy campaigners shift their 
focus away from funding and towards more judicially-enforceable iterations of the right. 
 There is no obvious answer to this problem, nor does this Article attempt to 
suggest one.  Whether it be conceiving of education as a procedural right or framing it as 
the right to some minimum set of non-monetary entitlements such as preschool, the way 
forward for education suits will no doubt be difficult.  Despite the difficulty, however, 
pathbreaking new strategies must be sought before they are found.  Education is too 
important a part of this country’s promise and its future to ignore the signs that current 
litigation strategies have reached the end of their usefulness.   
 
 
 
 
 
